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Abstract 
This paper uses stochastic frontier analysis and Tobit regressions to provide 
international evidence on the impact of regulatory, supervision and environmental 
factors on bank efficiency.  Our contribution is twofold. First, we use a newly 
constructed database of 3,086 observations from 677 publicly quoted commercial 
banks operating in 88 countries to provide cross-country evidence on the determinants 
of banks’ cost and profit efficiency during the period 2000-2004.  Second, we utilise a 
relatively new database of the World Bank (WB), to investigate the impact of a broad 
range of regulatory and supervision measures, including capital requirements, 
restrictions on bank activities, private monitoring, official supervisory power of the 
authorities, and deposit insurance. Our results suggest a robust association of some of 
these measures with bank efficiency, and we also reveal some similarities and 
differences in the determinants of cost and profit efficiency, with plausible effects of 
the impact of the conditioning environmental factors on bank efficiency.         
 
Keywords: Banking, Efficiency, Regulations, Stochastic frontier analysis, 
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1. Introduction  
A number of studies have recently made use of available cross-country World Bank 
(WB) database1 constructed by Barth et al (2001a, 2004a) to provide international 
evidence on the impact of regulations and supervision on banks’ performance as 
measured by financial ratios (e.g. Barth et al., 2002; 2003a, Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
2004; Levine, 2004), risk-taking behaviour (Gonzalez, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 
2006), overall soundless as measured by credit ratings (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2006; 
Pasiouras et al., 2006), stability and banking sector crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002; Barth et al., 2004b; Beck et al., 2006a).  This paper builds on this 
strand of the literature by studying the impact of the regulatory environment on 
banks’ cost and profit efficiency, using efficient frontiers rather than financial ratios2.  
The importance of specifying environmental variables while studying 
efficiency in the banking industry has been recognized in the literature (e.g. Dietsch 
and Lozano-Vivas, 2000), and most of the recent studies that use cross-country data 
account for some measures of the environment in which banks operate, such as 
market capitalization, GDP growth, etc. However, with regard to the regulatory 
aspects of the environment the empirical literature on bank efficiency so far has been 
constrained, owing to data limitations, to investigation of the use of simple measures 
such as the degree of market concentration, industry average capital, industry average 
profitability and intermediation ratios (e.g. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Lozano-
Vivas et al., 2002).  
                                                 
1
 The WB database on bank regulations was originally constructed by Barth et al. (2001a) and the data 
were available from 1999. It was updated in early 2004 with data from 2003 (henceforth referred to as 
Barth et al. (2004a). 
2
 Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Bauer et al. (1998) emphasise that efficient frontier approaches 
seem to be superior compared to the use of traditional financial ratios from accounting statements - 
such as return on assets (ROA) or the cost/revenue ratio – in terms of measuring performance. Berger 
and Humphrey (1997) also point out that the frontier approaches offer an overall objective numerical 
score and ranking, an efficiency proxy to comply with the economic optimization mechanism. 
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Pasiouras (2007) takes the first step, to our knowledge, in extending the above 
literature by investigating the impact of a broad range of regulatory and supervision 
measures on banks’ technical efficiency, using data envelopment analysis (DEA) on a 
sample of 715 banks operating in 95 countries during 2003.  In this paper, by contrast, 
we concentrate in estimating cost and profit efficiency3 of banks using stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). The main advantage of SFA over DEA is that it allows us to 
distinguish between inefficiency and other stochastic shocks (Yildirim and 
Philippatos, 2006) in the estimation of efficiency scores. Furthermore, we use panel 
data over the period 2000-2004 rather than cross-section data at one point in time (i.e. 
2003) since it has been argued that efficiency is better studied and modelled with 
panels (Carbo et al., 2002). Maudos et al. (2002) point out that estimation of profit 
efficiency and its comparison to cost efficiency, and international efficiency 
comparisons are two areas where the available evidence on bank efficiency is very 
limited. Our study contributes in filling this gap, while at the same time provides 
statistical evidence of the association of these two efficiency measures with the 
regulation and supervision approaches around the world, using a cross-country dataset 
of 677 publicly quoted commercial banks representing 88 countries.    
We employ a two-stage estimation procedure as in Carbo et al. (2002), 
Maudos et al. (2002), Bos and Kool (2006), Yildirim and Philippatos (2006) among 
several others. In the first stage, SFA is used on the banks’ financial information to 
obtain cost and profit efficiency scores. In the second stage, we use Tobit regressions 
in order to assess the impact of regulatory and environmental measures on efficiency. 
We examine a broad range of regulatory and supervision variables that are related to 
capital adequacy requirements, private monitoring, official disciplinary power of the 
                                                 
3Cost efficiency is a wider concept than technical efficiency, since it refers to both technical and 
allocative efficiency. Profit efficiency is an even wider concept as it combines both costs and revenues 
in the measurement of efficiency.  
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authorities, restrictions on banking activities, and deposit insurance schemes. In 
assessing the impact of these measures, we control for bank size and bank capital, and 
check for robustness by adding country level environmental variables, replacing them 
as appropriate to account separately for cross-country differences in macroeconomic 
conditions, financial development, market structure, overall institutional development 
and access to banking services. The results generally indicate that there are 
similarities and differences in the impact of regulatory, supervision and environmental 
measures on cost and profit efficiency. Overall, apart from deposit insurance, the 
impact of the regulatory related variables is robust to changes in the environmental 
conditions, some of which also have plausible effects on bank efficiency. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
background discussion on the impact of regulations in banking. Section 3 covers the 
methodological issues and data for our empirical work. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.     
 
2. Background discussion  
The banking crises around the world over the last thirty years along with evidence that 
economic growth is related to the development of the financial sector have attracted 
the attention of policy makers on the construction of an appropriate regulatory and 
supervision framework (Levine, 2005; Barth et al. 2003a, 2004b).  
While many countries are in the process of upgrading their bank regulation 
and supervision approaches, this is a complex and difficult process because there is no 
clear answer on what exactly is good regulation and supervision (Demirguc-Kunt et 
al., 2006) or on how specific regulations affect the performance and stability of the 
banking sector. More precisely, Barth et al. (2004b) point out that economic theory 
provides conflicting predictions about the effect of regulations and supervisory 
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practices on banks, while it also makes subtle predictions about the precise conditions 
under which regulations and supervisory practices will achieve the desired outcomes. 
Furthermore, cross-country empirical evidence is rather limited on which of the many 
different regulations and supervisory practices adopted around the world promote 
bank development and stability (Barth et al., 2004b), and we attempt to provide such 
evidence associating their effect on banking sector efficiency.   
The traditional view of the impact of bank regulation is that higher capital 
requirements will have a positive effect on the banking sector. However, some studies 
indicate that capital requirements increase risk-taking behaviour (e.g. Blum, 1999; 
Calem and Rob, 1999), while others argue that this happens only under specific 
circumstances (Kendall, 1992). Barth et al. (2004b) find that while stringent capital 
requirements are associated with fewer non-performing loans, capital stringency is not 
robustly linked with banking sector stability, development or bank performance 
(measured with overhead and margin ratios) when controlling for other supervisory-
regulatory policies.  
In theory, there tends to be support for both the official supervision approach 
and the private monitoring approach4 to bank supervision. The official supervision 
approach argues that official supervisors have the capabilities to avoid market failure 
by directly overseeing, regulating, and disciplining banks. By contrast, the private 
monitoring approach argues that powerful supervision might be related to corruption 
or other factors that impede bank operations, and regulations that promote private 
monitoring will result in better outcomes for the banking sector. While these two 
approaches of supervision might reflect different attitudes towards the role of the 
authorities in monitoring banks, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Levine, 
                                                 
4
 Barth et al. (2004b) and Levine (2004) provide discussions of these two approaches. 
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2004). Consequently, in practice countries could adopt regulations that enhance both 
the disclosure of accurate information and the creation of powerful supervisors 
(Levine, 2004). Under this combined approach, a greater quality of information 
provided by a system that enhances private monitoring through accounting and 
auditing requirements might boost supervisors’ abilities to intervene in managerial 
decisions in the right way and at the right time (Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2005).  
In addition to these regulatory approaches, which are related to the three 
pillars of Basel II, we also comment briefly on two other measures deemed to have an 
impact on banks’ cost and profit efficiency, namely restrictions on bank activities and 
deposit insurance schemes.  
Barth et al. (2004b) outline several theoretical reasons for restricting bank 
activities as well as alternative reasons for allowing banks to participate in a broad 
range of activities. For example, emphasising the argument by Boyd et al. (1998), 
they suggest that as moral hazard encourages riskier behaviour, banks will have 
opportunities to increase risk if allowed to engage in a broader range of activities. On 
the other hand, fewer regulatory restrictions permit the utilization of economies of 
scale and scope (Claessens and Klingebiel, 2000), whilst also increase the franchise 
value of banks and result in a more sensible behaviour.  
 Finally, as pointed out by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), several 
countries have established a system of national deposit insurance over the last 25 
years, this being viewed as a way of avoiding bank runs and thereby contributing to 
bank stability. However, it can also create moral hazard problems and encourage 
excessive risk-taking behaviour, as supported by evidence from several studies (e.g. 
Hendrickson and Nichols, 2001); or adversely affect the stability of the banking 
systems as a whole (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002).  
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3. Methodology, Variables and Data    
3.1. Methodology  
The stochastic frontier approach has been applied to several recent studies in banking 
and as already mentioned we use it in our first stage to estimate cost and profit 
efficiency of banks. As in Casu and Girardone (2004) and Beccalli et al. (2006) 
among others, we adopt the Battese and Coelli (1992) model for panel data, with 
individual firm effects assumed to be distributed as truncated normal variables, and 
permitted to vary systematically with time.  
Starting with the specification of the cost frontier, we follow the value added 
approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1992) and as in Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), 
Maudos et al. (2002), Cavallo and Rossi (2002) and others, we choose the following 
three outputs: loans (Q1), other earning assets (Q2), and total deposits (i.e. customer 
and interbank) (Q3). Furthermore, consistent with most previous studies on banking 
efficiency we select the following three input prices: cost of loanable funds (P1), 
calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits; cost of physical capital 
(P2), calculated by dividing the expenditures on plant and equipment (i.e. overhead 
expenses net of personnel expenses) by the book value of fixed assets; and cost of 
labour (P3), calculated by dividing the personnel expenses by total assets5. Using the 
multi-product translog specification gives our empirical cost frontier model as 
follows:  
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5
 We use total assets rather than the number of employers due to several missing values for the later. 
Our approach is consistent with several previous studies such as Carbo et al. (2002), Maudos et al. 
(2002), Carvallo and Kasman (2005), Beccalli et al. (2006).  
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where TCkt is total cost (i.e. interest expenses plus non-interest expenses) of bank k in 
period t (t=1, 2, …, T); Qikt corresponds to the output i (Qi, i=1, …., 3) of bank k in 
period t; Pikt represents the input price (Pi) for input factor i (i=1, …., 3) of bank k in 
period t; vkt are random errors assumed to be iid and N(0,σv2); ukt being non-negative 
random variables accounting for cost inefficiency and assumed to be iid with 
truncations at zero on the N(µ,σu2) distribution, and ukt = (ukexp(-η(t-T))), where η is 
an unknown scalar parameter; and αi,αij, βi, βij γij are the parameters to be estimated.  
 In the case of the profit frontier model, the variable to be explained is the 
profit before taxes (PBT). As in most previous studies we estimate an alternative 
profit frontier, which ignores output price data by assuming imperfect competition. 
Consequently, the specification of the profit frontier model is the same as that of the 
cost frontier (equation (1)) with PBTkt replacing TCkt as the dependent variable. 
However, the sign of the inefficiency term now becomes negative (-ukt).  
 We also impose linear homogeneity restrictions by normalizing the dependent 
variable and all input prices by the third input price P3. Additionally, since a number 
of banks in the sample exhibit negative profits (i.e. losses), the dependent variable in 
the profit model is transformed to ( )( )1//ln min33 ++ PPBTPPBT , where 
min
3 )/( PPBT  is the minimum absolute value of )/( 3PPBT  over all banks in the 
sample6.  
All bank-specific data for the estimation of the efficient frontiers were directly 
converted to US dollars, in Bankscope, prior to downloading. Furthermore, as in 
Altunbas et al. (2001) and Hauner (2005) among others, we expressed the data in real 
                                                 
6
 So that the dependent variable is ( ) 01ln = for the bank with lowest PBT, and positive for all other 
banks.  Apart from that, the range of variability in PBT is smaller than in TC, which accounts for most 
of the differences in the results for cost and profit efficiency.  
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1995 terms using individual country GDP deflators. Table 1 presents the mean of the 
variables discussed above by year (Panel A) and geographical region (Panel B)7.  
 
 
[Insert Table 1 Around Here] 
 
 
The parameters of the stochastic frontier models are estimated using maximum 
likelihood8. The individual bank (in)efficiency scores are calculated from the 
estimated frontiers as CEkt= exp(ui) and PEFkt = exp(-ui), the former taking a value 
between one and infinity and the latter between zero and one. To make our results 
comparable, however, we calculate the index of cost efficiency as follows: CEFkt= 1/ 
CEkt. Hence, in both cases our efficiency scores will be between 0 and 1 with values 
closer to 1 indicating a higher level of efficiency.  
 
3.2. Explanatory variables in Tobit Regressions  
This section briefly outlines the set of regulatory and appropriate control variables 
used in Tobit regressions, while Appendix A provides further details on their 
calculations and sources of information.  
 
3.2.1 Regulations and supervision related variables  
CAPRQ is an index of capital requirements, accounting for both initial and overall 
capital stringency. PRMONIT is an index of private monitoring, indicating the degree 
of information that is released to officials and the public, auditing related 
requirements and whether credit ratings are required. OFPR indicates the ability of 
supervisors to exercise their power and get involved in banking decisions related to 
prompt corrective action, declaring insolvency, and restructuring. ACTRS is a proxy 
for the restrictions on the activities (i.e. securities, insurance, real estate) that banks 
                                                 
7
 In assigning countries in regions we follow the classification of Global Market Information Database 
(GMID) of Euromonitor International.  
8
 See Battese and Coelli (1992) and Coelli (1996), for further details.  
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can undertake as well as whether banks can own non-financial firms. Finally, 
DEPINS is a dummy variable indicating whether the country has an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme or not.  
 
3.2.2 Control variables  
We use the logarithm of total assets (SIZE) and the equity to assets ratio (EQAS) to 
control for bank size and capitalization9. In addition, we draw upon the relevant 
literature to select appropriate control variables in accounting for differences in 
various country level characteristics. Annual GDP growth (GRDGR) and annual 
inflation (INF) are commonly used measures to control for the country-specific 
macroeconomic environment (e.g. Maudos et al., 2002; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006). 
 To control for financial sector development across countries, we incorporate 
measures that proxy for the size of the banking system (ASSGDP), activity in the 
banking sector (CLAIMS) and size of the stock market (MACGDP). Same or similar 
measures have been used in other studies (e.g. Kasman and Yildirim, 2006, Pasiouras, 
2007). 
Also, following previous studies that focus on banks’ performance (Barth et 
al., 2002, 2004b; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Fries and Taci, 2005), we control for 
cross-country differences in the national structure and competitive conditions of the 
banking sector, using the percentage of foreign-owned (FOREIGN) and government-
owned (GOVERN) banks operating in the market, as well as the degree of 
concentration (CONC). Furthermore, we follow La Porta et al. (1998), Levine (1998) 
and others (e.g. Barth et al., 2004b; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004) who have studied the 
                                                 
9
 We do not control for other bank-specific characteristics such as loans to assets or deposits to assets 
ratios, as these elements (i.e. deposits, loans) were considered during the estimation of the efficiency 
frontiers. Their inclusion in the second stage of the analysis could therefore lead to potential 
endogeneity bias that is difficult to be deal with in Tobit regressions. 
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effects of different legal environments on the financial system, and control for 
differences in the institutional environment using indicators of the protection of 
property rights (PRIGHT) and  government intervention in the economy (GOVINT). 
Finally, following Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Maudos et al. (2002), and 
Pasiouras (2007), we control for access to banking services using the number of 
branches (BRAKM) and ATMs (ATMKM) per 1,000 sq km. 
 
3.3. Data and summary statistics 
Our final sample consists of 677 publicly quoted commercial banks10, operating in 88 
countries, for which data for at least one year are available between 2000 and 2004. 
This sample was determined as follows. We started by considering all the publicly 
quoted commercial banks in the Bankscope database, giving a total of 1,008 banks 
from 113 countries. We then excluded 72 banks from 15 countries not included in the 
Barth et al. (2004a) database. We further excluded 28 bank-year observations that 
corresponded to 15 banks operating in 3 countries for which GDP deflators where not 
available in GMID. Finally, we excluded any bank-year observation for which at least 
one of the dependent or explanatory bank-specific variables was zero or missing. This 
resulted in an unbalanced dataset of 3,086 bank-year observations. As shown in 
Appendix A, data for country-specific variables were collected from the WB 
databases, GMID and the Heritage Foundation. Table 2 presents the sample means of 
the independent variables by geographical region. 
 
 
[Insert Table 2 Around Here] 
 
                                                 
10
 We focus on publicly quoted banks because, as mentioned in Laeven and Levine (2006), it enhances 
comparability across countries. Furthermore, it allows us to examine a more homogenous sample in 
terms of services, and consequently inputs and outputs. Finally, it is more appropriate to use the sample 
for this type of banks since, as mentioned in Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004), the regulatory data of Barth 
et al. (2004a) are for commercial banks. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Stage 1- SFA results 
Table 3 presents the estimates of the efficiency score for the cost and profit frontier 
models11. The full sample overall mean profit efficiency score (PEF) equals 0.9402, 
while that of cost efficiency (CEF) is 0.8499, and the table also provides information 
about the level of banking efficiency by year (Panel A) and region (Panel B). The 
results indicate that over the period of estimation, banks have become more profit 
efficient albeit less cost efficient. This seemingly anomalous result implies in fact that 
banks operate at higher cost in order to achieve a higher level of profitability. 
 
  
[Insert Table 3 Around Here] 
 
 
More specifically, PEF increases each successive year from 0.9235 in 2000 to 
0.9548 in 2004, while CEF declines over the corresponding period from 0.8568 to 
0.8448. Of the seven regions, Australia has the most profit efficient banking system 
(0.9495), followed by Eastern Europe (0.9481), while North America (0.9378) and 
Western Europe (0.9373) show the lowest scores. However, the latter two are the 
most cost efficient banking systems with CEF scores of 0.9329 and 0.8910 
respectively. By contrast, the less cost efficient banking sectors are those of Latin 
America and Caribbean (0.7855) and Eastern Europe (0.8068). Hence, as in previous 
studies, we observe that the most cost efficient banks are not necessarily the most 
profit efficient banks and visa versa,12 and our findings confirm this anomalous trend 
for the time period 2000-2004. Consequently, we support the argument of Guevara 
                                                 
11These were obtained using the Frontier 4.1 computer program discussed in Coelli (1996).  
12Casu and Girardone (2004) report that over the period 1996-1999 the most cost efficient banking 
groups in Italy seem to be also the least profitable. Guevara and Maudos (2002) examine cost and 
profit efficiency in EU-15, and indicate that the “other bank institutions” group is the most efficient in 
terms of costs but the most inefficient in terms of profits. Berger and Mester (1997) also show that 
profit efficiency is not positively correlated with cost efficiency.   
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and Maudos (2002) that the analysis of cost efficiency offers only a partial view of 
banks’ efficiency and it is therefore important to analyze profit efficiency as well.     
 
4.2. Stage 2- Tobit regression results  
In the second stage, as already mentioned, we investigate the determinants of bank 
efficiency by estimating Tobit regressions using the efficiency scores CEF and PEF as 
the dependent variables. Since these scores range between 0 and 1, Tobit regressions 
are more appropriate than OLS. Since use of estimated scores as dependent variables 
in a two-stage process can render heteroskedasticity (Saxonhouse, 1976), we follow 
Hauner (2005) and Pasiouras (2007) in reporting QML (Huber/White) standard errors 
and covariates.   
We estimate several specifications of the Tobit model, while controlling for 
two bank-specific attributes and various country characteristics discussed in Section 
3. In each specification, we include all the regulatory variables, since Barth et al. 
(2004b) and Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) among others indicate that many 
regulations can be substitutes or complements and countries will probably not select 
these policies in isolation.13 However, we do not simultaneously include all the 
control variables for two reasons. First, this would considerably reduce the degrees of 
freedom and presumably affect the significance of the estimates14. Second, including 
many regressors increases the potential for multicollinearity.  
The regression results obtained with different sets of control variables are 
presented in Columns 1 to 6 of Tables 4 and 5 for cost (CEF) and profit efficiency 
                                                 
13
 We also estimated specifications with regulatory variables entering individually, and the results 
obtained are similar.  To conserve space we do not report the full set of results, which are available 
from the authors upon request. 
14
 Simultaneously considering all variables would significantly decrease the number of available 
observations due to different missing observations for different countries.  
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(PEF) respectively. Depending on data availability, the estimation sample ranges 
between 2,366 and 2,974 observations15.   
 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 Around Here] 
 
Comparing the results in Tables 4 and 5 we observe one similarity but 
otherwise significant differences in the effects of the regulatory variables between 
cost and profit efficiency. More precisely, only ACTRS has a statistically significant 
impact on both CEF and PEF in all cases. The negative sign of its coefficient indicates 
that higher (lower) restrictions on the activities that banks undertake reduce (increase) 
bank efficiency. This is consistent with the view that less regulatory control allows 
banks to engage in various activities which result in exploitation of economies of 
scale and scope and generate income from several sources, thus increasing both cost 
and profit efficiency.  
In most cases, the other regulatory variables have a statistically significant 
impact only on CEF. The effect of CAPRQ is positive, and statistically significant in 
four specifications (Table 4), indicating that more stringent regulations related to 
capitalization result in higher cost efficiency. We also find that the existence of a 
deposit insurance scheme (DEPINS) has an influence on cost efficiency; however its 
statistical significance and sign depends on the control variables that enter the 
equation. To some extent this result is consistent with previous studies examining the 
performance, stability, and risk-taking in the banking industry, which indicate that the 
impact of deposit insurance depends on other regulations and the overall environment 
                                                 
15At this stage, we also excluded from the sample the bank with the lowest PBT/P3. This bank had an 
efficiency score (i.e. dependent variable) considerably lower than all the other scores in the sample, and 
this outlier could potentially bias the regression estimates. In the specifications with regulatory 
variables entering individually, the sample ranges between 2,366 and 3,082 observations.  
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in which banks operate (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Barth et al., 2004b; 
Pasiouras et al., 2006).      
As with ACTRS, the effect of PRMONIT is negative, as expected, suggesting 
that higher requirements related to private monitoring reduce cost efficiency. This 
effect might be associated to higher costs required to meet increased disclosure 
requirements, such as consolidated accounts, disclosure of off-balance sheet items and 
risk management procedures to supervisors and to the public, auditing by certified 
auditors, as well as further expenses to obtain credit ratings from external agencies. 
Alternatively, it could be associated to possible differences between reported figures 
and actual costs. Assuming that banks in less developed accounting and auditing 
environments have more incentives to hide part of their expenditures for tax reasons, 
it is plausible that lower requirements of private monitoring could present higher cost 
efficiency.  
Similarly, the impact of OFPR is negative and statistically significant on CEF 
(except in one specification). Hence, as in Levine (2004), we find that official 
supervisory power of the authorities exerts a negative influence on the functioning of 
banks. Barth et al. (2003b) also indicate that official government power is particularly 
harmful to bank development in countries with closed political systems. That higher 
supervisory power increases cost inefficiency, as in our case, is also consistent with 
the view that powerful supervisors may use their power to induce banks to lend 
politically-connected firms on advantageous terms16.  
Turning to the effects of control variables, we find that when we control only 
for bank-specific characteristics (Column 1), higher size results in higher cost 
                                                 
16As Barth et al. (2004b) summarize powerful supervisors may use their power to benefit favored 
constituents, attract camain donations and extract bribes. Both Barth et al. (2004b) and Levine (2004) 
report positive and statistically significant relationships between corruption and official supervisory 
power using international datasets.  
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efficiency, but not in higher profit efficiency. In contrast, EQAS has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on both CEF and PEF, its effect more dominant on the 
former. While one may expect the effect of EQAS and CAPRQ to be of the same 
sign, this is not necessarily so for two reasons. First, the construction of CAPRQ is 
mostly related to the way the capital ratios are calculated rather than to their absolute 
values (Appendix A). Second, while capital adequacy requirements refer to risk-
weighted ratios, we have used the equity to assets ratio as a measure of capitalization 
(EQAS) as in most previous studies, owing to data availability17. The coefficient 
values on this term indicate that, on average, EQAS affects CEF by roughly 30% and 
PEF by 1.5%. Although this result contradicts some previous studies, it is consistent 
with Allen and Rai (1996) who report that higher stockholders’ equity (relative to 
total assets) increases inefficiency for small universal banks and large banks in 
countries that prohibit functional integration of commercial and investment banking. 
Similarly, Cavallo and Rossi (2002) report a positive and significant relationship 
between capitalization and cost inefficiency for Germany and Italy.  
One potential explanation of the above finding is that more skilful managers 
can generate profits and achieve efficient use of inputs while operating with higher 
leverage. Another explanation, potentially related to moral hazard theory, is that 
banks with lower capital levels may increase their risk-taking. Hence, by investing in 
more risky but potentially more profitable activities, these banks may turn out to be 
more efficient in the short term, although they will probably pay the consequences of 
                                                 
17Data unavailability or many missing values in Bankscope precluded the use of risk-weighted ratios 
such as Tier 1 ratio or total capital ratio.  According to Valkanov and Kleimeir (2007), the use of risk-
weighted ratios might imply different results, in contrast to the ones we obtained with the equity to 
assets ratio.   They mention that the denominator of regulatory ratios consists of risk-weighted assets, 
rather than average total assets. Consequently, more risk-averse banks having their portfolios invested 
in less risky assets, will have lower risk-adjusted assets and, consequently, higher regulatory capital 
ratios than an otherwise similar but less risk-averse banks. In addition, the more risk-averse a bank is, 
the higher its risk-based capital ratios will be relative to its equity-to-assets ratio. While examining 
acquisitions they argue that this can explain why target banks have, on average, higher regulatory 
capital ratios but at the same time lower equity capitalization rates than other institutions. 
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their risky behaviour in the long term. Furthermore, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 
(2006) mention that under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, more efficient firms tend to 
choose relatively low equity ratios, as higher expected returns from greater profit 
efficiency substitutes to some degree for equity capital in protecting the firm against 
financial distress18.  While interpreting our results, it should be also kept in mind that 
our sample consists of only publicly quoted banks, which are typically the larger ones 
in a given country and as mentioned by McAllister and McManus (1993) and 
Demsetz and Strahan (1997) tend to operate with lower capital ratios.   
 The results in column 2 show that controlling for the macroeconomic 
environment (using GDPR and INF) does not significantly change the impact of the 
regulatory variables or EQAS on CEF and PEF. However, with respect to the impact 
of SIZE the results are now mixed, this effect being displaced partly by the impact of 
inflation (INF). In other words, higher inflation has a more significant influence on 
increasing costs and reducing profits, implying lower cost and profit efficiency, as 
found by Kasman and Yildirim (2006). In addition, GDPGR has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on PEF. Hence, as in Maudos et al. (2002) we find that 
banks operating in expanding markets present higher levels of profit efficiency. 
Furthermore, Maudos et al. (2002) report that under expansive demand conditions, 
banks feel less pressured to control their expenses and become less cost efficient. 
Although we find a negative impact of GDPGR on CEF, this is insignificant. 
Of the three variables chosen to control for financial sector development 
(Column 3), only stock market capitalisation (MACGDP) has a statistically 
significant impact on both CEF and PEF. Kasman and Yildirim (2006) also find that 
both cost and profit efficiency increases as market capitalization increases, while 
                                                 
18
 In their extended US banks’ study investigating the relationship between profit efficiency and capital 
structure, they find that lower equity capital ratio is associated with higher profit efficiency, an effect 
that is economically and statistically significant. 
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Pasiouras (2007) confirms the same for technical efficiency. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) also find a positive relationship between stock market capitalization 
and net interest margin, attributing it to a complementarity effect between debt and 
equity financing. Furthermore, Barth et al. (2003a) report a positive and significant 
relationship between stock market capitalization and return on assets in half of their 
specifications. These findings support the view that, as stock markets develop, 
improved information availability increases the potential pool of borrowers, making it 
easier for banks to identify and monitor them, which can obviously have a positive 
impact on both cost and profit efficiency.  Appropriately we also find a significantly 
positive impact of the level of activity in the banking sector (CLAIMS) on CEF, 
although its effect on PEF is negative (but insignificant).  We also find a marginally 
negative impact of the size of the banking sector (ASSGDP) on CEF.   
Column 4 reports the results after including the three market structure 
indicators (GOVERN, FOREIGN and CONC). In this case, with regard to the bank-
specific and regulatory variables, the results are mostly consistent with those of 
Column 1, with the impact of CAPRQ now statistically significant on both cost and 
profit efficiency. However, the three control variables have opposite effects on CEF 
and PEF, and their effects differ in terms of magnitude and significance. The 
significance of GOVERN on both implies that a higher share of government owned 
banks contributes to higher CEF, but results in lower PEF (and its effect here is very 
marginal). In a sense, the positive effect on CEF is consistent with the view that 
government-owned banks contribute to economic development and improvement of 
welfare (Stiglitz, 1994), whereas the opposite effect on PEF can be associated with 
the claim that government ownership can have negative consequences for the 
financial and banking sectors (Barth et al., 2001b). The negative and statistically 
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significant impact on cost efficiency of the presence of foreign banks in the market 
(FOREIGN) is consistent with Ataullah and Le (2006).19 We also find some evidence 
(although very limited and marginal) to support the opposite view that a higher 
proportion of foreign banks has a positive impact on the banking sector, consistent 
with prior studies that report a positive association with profitability (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 1999; Barth et al., 2002, 2003a) and credit ratings (Pasiouras et al., 
2006). Also, higher concentration (CONC) results in higher cost efficiency, as in 
Ataullah and Le (2006) and others. This effect is quite significant relative to the 
effects of GOVERN and FOREIGN and suggests that larger banks operating in more 
competitive markets (with foreign and state banks) are under increased pressure to 
control their costs. However, the effect of CONC on PEF is insignificant, indicating 
further differences in the results for cost and profit efficiency. 
Controlling for institutional development within each country (using PRIGHT 
and GOVINT - Column 5) we find that the results for CEF are robust and, as in 
Column 4, CAPRQ has a positive and marginally significant impact on PEF. 
However, the significance of OFPR is now displaced. The most significant change in 
the results for PEF is the positive and statistically significant impact of bank SIZE, 
associated mainly with the impact of the property rights variable (PRIGHT). In turn, 
this contributes to the insignificance of OFPR, but at the same time we uncover a 
positive and statistically significant effect of DEPINS on PEF.  In Column 3, we 
controlled for financial sector development and observed a statistically significant 
(and negative) effect of DEPINS on CEF.  Here, the impact of DEPINS on CEF is 
insignificant (although remains negative), this being displaced by the inclusion of the 
environmental variables, both of which are significant on CEF. Together, these results 
                                                 
19Our sample includes banks from several less developed countries, where the recent and rapid entry of 
foreign banks has led to an increase in costs of domestic banks in the short-run in order to set up 
advanced information systems and risk management practices introduced by foreign banks. 
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indicate that deposit insurance has a discernible effect on bank cost or profit 
efficiency, but the effect seems to depend on financial sector and institutional 
development.  As regards the impact of PRIGHT, this is positive on CEF but negative 
on PEF.  This seemingly anomalous result may be due to factors such as country laws 
that protect private property, and court systems that enforce contracts, which 
contribute to cost efficiency, but otherwise the reduction in profit efficiency may be 
due to high levels of corruption and expropriation in developing countries. However, 
the positive effect of PRIGHT on CEF is consistent with that found by Pasiouras 
(2007) on technical efficiency, and the negative impact on profit efficiency is 
consistent with the findings of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004). Another way of 
explaining the opposite effects may be the due to the degree to which banks can 
increase the gap between what they pay savers (i.e. minimizing cost inefficiency) and 
what they receive from borrowers (maximizing profit efficiency), which is dependent 
upon the state of the economy or the institutional environment. Furthermore, banks’ 
risk taking capabilities can potentially vary with the institutional environment20. 
Column 6 shows the results of our regressions while conditioning for access to 
the banking system through branch services and ATMs. It should be noted that the 
sample in this case has been reduced by approximately 700 banks observations owing 
to the absence of data on ATMKM and BRAKM for several countries, and therefore 
comparisons with previous results need to be treated with caution. However, we 
observe only minor differences in the results for CEF (such as the insignificant impact 
of SIZE in most specifications that we estimated), but otherwise the results are robust 
with both ATMKM and BRAKM being statistically significant. The sign of these 
coefficients indicates that, contrary to expectations, cost efficiency rises as the 
                                                 
20Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) report that banks carry a higher risk in a poor legal system with 
improper enforcement of rules. 
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number of branches per 1,000 square km increases and falls with the increase in 
ATMs.  However, the magnitude of these effects is very small and the effects are not 
robust to alternative specifications21.  None of these two effects are significant on 
PEF22, and so the results in this case resemble those of Column 1 indicating that profit 
efficiency is driven mainly by EQAS and ACTRS in the absence of other significant 
environmental factors.   
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper extends the literature on bank efficiency by providing empirical evidence 
on the association between cost and profit efficiency and regulation and supervisory 
approaches around the world. Our sample consisted of a panel dataset of 3,086 
financial observations covering the period 2000-2004, comprising 677 publicly listed 
commercial banks operating in 88 countries. We first employed stochastic frontier 
analysis on bank financial information to estimate cost and profit efficiency, and then 
performed Tobit regressions to investigate the impact on these measures of 
regulations related to capital adequacy, private monitoring, disciplinary power of the 
authorities, restrictions on banks’ activities, and deposit insurance, subject to changes 
in the environmental conditions to account for macroeconomic factors, financial 
development, market structure, overall institutional development, and access to 
banking services.  
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 We estimated alternative specifications, with ATMKM and BRAKM entered individually, and found 
that BRAKM remained statistically significant and positively related to CEF, but the effect of 
ATMKM became positive and significant on CEF in some specifications. In any case, the magnitude 
and hence the economic significance of these coefficients remains very marginal.  We also replaced 
ATMKM and BRAKM by the ratio of BRAKM/ATMKM, and obtained some inconsistent results.  For 
example, BRAKM/ATKM was positive and statistically significant in some specifications but negative 
and statistically significant in other specifications. Hence, we conclude that the effects of these 
variables are not robust. 
22In this case, both variables were insignificant in alternative specifications too, and no statistically 
significant association was found between BRAKM/ATMKM and PEF.  
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The empirical results show a robust association of some of the regulatory and 
environmental measures with cost efficiency and to a limited extent with profit 
efficiency, after accounting for bank size and capitalization as bank-specific control 
factors. In this context, our results reveal some similarities and differences in the 
determinants of cost and profit efficiency. In most specifications, cost efficiency is 
influenced by regulations related to capital requirements, private monitoring (i.e. 
information disclosure), official power of the authorities, and restrictions on banking 
activities. However, profit efficiency is affected only by restrictions on the activities 
that banks can undertake. The impact of these measures is marginal compared to the 
influence of bank level capitalization, but is invariant to robustness checks conducted 
by changing the conditioning environmental variables. 
Our results also indicate that the significance of some regulatory measures is 
governed by the conditioning variables. For example, capital adequacy requirements 
improve profit efficiency in market environments where the effect of government 
ownership of banks is also significant.  Similarly, the impact of deposit insurance on 
banks efficiency depends on the financial and institutional development of the 
countries.  Similarly, the impact of bank size on cost efficiency is either positive or 
negative, depending on the state of the economy. The impact of bank size on profit 
efficiency is found to be positive and statistically significant only with better 
protection of property rights. We also find that some of the conditioning variables 
have plausible effects on the two measures of efficiency, in some cases similar and in 
others opposite.  
Whilst providing comprehensive cross-country evidence on the impact of 
regulatory and environmental factors on bank efficiency, it seems appropriate to 
conclude by addressing some of the data-related issues that have constrained the 
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scope of this study. First, since the WB database on bank regulations is available for 
only two points in time, we have assumed that regulatory policies within each country 
remained constant over the time period of our analysis. This, however, does not seem 
unreasonable, since Barth et al. (2004b) point out that such regulations change very 
little over time and control of these influences in their study did not alter their 
findings.23  Second, in obtaining efficiency scores we used general proxies for input 
prices, as missing values for the number of employees and detailed information on 
expenditures relating to depreciation precluded calculation of more accurate 
measures. Furthermore, owing to data availability we had to rely on endogenous 
prices (i.e. calculated from banks own accounts) rather than exogenous ones as 
recently suggested by Berger and Mester (2003) and Bos and Kool (2006). 
Nevertheless, our approach to estimating efficiency is consistent with a majority of 
previous studies and we believe that, despite these data based limitations, our study 
represents an advance on the existing literature in uncovering international evidence 
suggesting an association between the regulatory environment and bank efficiency. 
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Table 1: Mean of variables used in Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
 
 TC PBT Q1 Q2 Q3 P1 P2 P3 
Panel A: Sample means by year         
2000 (N = 575) 873.074 118.615 8,381.672 6,613.135 13,152.846 0.054 0.998 0.018 
2001 (N = 602) 809.363 83.396 8,176.305 6,606.077 13,077.034 0.050 1.021 0.017 
2002 (N = 621) 734.972 95.210 8,783.130 6,975.897 13,799.882 0.047 1.133 0.017 
2003 (N = 641) 748.285 139.979 10,322.076 8,662.502 16,532.132 0.038 1.214 0.016 
2004 (N = 647) 761.867 173.618 11,495.451 9,835.891 18,294.350 0.035 1.308 0.015 
Panel B: Sample means by geographical region      
Africa & Middle East (N = 517) 163.619 49.453 1,592.864 1,382.395 2,744.158 0.049 0.861 0.015 
Asia Pacific (N = 1,002) 392.060 77.288 9,885.413 5,365.697 14,315.382 0.032 0.637 0.010 
Australia (N = 45) 2,569.739 773.507 37,049.115 8,974.930 37,235.083 0.046 3.817 0.008 
Eastern Europe (N = 303) 79.724 19.264 516.102 461.126 871.469 0.049 0.743 0.022 
Latin America & Caribbean (N = 432) 282.308 44.403 1,577.219 1,515.927 2,714.908 0.077 1.246 0.031 
North America (N = 96) 2,775.936 512.131 26,212.362 18930.098 41,758.425 0.027 1.910 0.016 
Western Europe (N = 691) 2,044.246 242.530 19,536.757 21,593.398 34,087.559 0.040 1.903 0.015 
Total sample average 783.620 123.004 9,478.266 7,786.108 15,048.130 0.045 1.140 0.016 
Notes: TC: Total Cost, PBT: Profits before taxes; Q1: Loans, Q2: Other earning assets, Q3: Deposits; P1: Interest expenses/Deposits, 
P2: Other overhead expenses/Fixed assets, P3: Personnel expenses/total assets; TC, PBT, Q1, Q2, Q3 are in $ millions expressed in real 
1995 terms; In assigning countries in regions we follow the classification of Global Market Information Database (GMID) of Euromonitor 
International.  
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Table 2: Sample means of independent variables* 
 
 Africa & Middle 
East 
Asia Pacific Australia Eastern 
Europe 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
North 
America 
Western 
Europe 
Total 
Number of bank observations 517 1,002 45 303 432 96 691 3,086 
Number of countries 23 14 1 14 15 2 19 88 
CAPRQ 6.4197 5.5212 7.0000 5.2541 5.4375 4.0625 5.9667 5.7103 
PRMONIT 7.4004 7.5544 8.0000 7.1155 7.1644 7.4688 7.4443 7.4096 
OFPR 8.6230 8.9912 8.0000 7.8977 7.8109 7.1250 5.9334 7.8643 
ACTRS 2.5048 2.7740 2.7500 2.2170 2.7471 2.2813 2.1378 2.5123 
DEPINS** 249 842 45 176 242 96 528 2178 
SIZE 3.0032 3.6495 4.3517 2.3088 2.6336 3.8168 3.5990 3.2715 
EQAS 0.1083 0.0704 0.0688 0.1453 0.1269 0.0808 0.0954 0.0979 
INF 4.2018 2.1226 3.3940 6.5025 10.5950 2.4685 3.5280 4.4310 
GDPGR 5.0716 3.9521 3.2400 4.7099 2.9657 2.7563 2.2454 3.6462 
MACGDP 0.7794 0.6030 1.0464 0.1678 0.2798 1.1854 0.7046 0.5946 
ASSGDP 0.2212 0.2454 0.0797 0.1225 0.0472 0.1302 0.5797 0.2737 
CLAIMS 0.4681 0.7391 0.9327 0.3056 0.2420 0.5577 1.1238 0.6642 
GOVERN 16.1829 22.9417 0.0000 12.0947 13.3284 0.0000 9.6867 15.4736 
FOREIGN 28.9724 15.0973 17.0000 64.9881 28.1187 12.3438 8.2068 22.9962 
CONC 0.6497 0.4398 0.6399 0.5964 0.5466 0.3979 0.6666 0.5575 
GOVINT 3.7327 2.4104 2.0000 2.7295 2.9028 2.1875 2.8466 2.8141 
PRIGHT 3.3228 3.6056 5.0000 2.6199 2.7847 5.0000 4.5137 3.6183 
BRAKM 28.2294 30.8635 0.7731 12.5345 4.2154 5.9428 71.0701 33.2955 
ATMKM 55.2819 262.1683 1.6616 23.6609 8.3641 22.5915 98.4612 116.6114 
Notes: *Sample means for country-specific variables have been calculated on the basis of bank observations (e.g. N = 3,086) and not country observations (e.g. N =88). In some 
cases, the sample number is lower than the one mentioned in the second line due to missing values; **In the case of DEPINS the figure corresponds to the number of observations 
 (i.e. banks) operating under an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 3: Cost and Profit efficiency estimates 
 
  Cost Efficiency 
(CEF) 
Profit Efficiency 
(PEF) 
Panel A: Mean by year  
2000 0.8568 0.9235 
2001 0.8540 0.9320 
2002 0.8493 0.9405 
2003 0.8457 0.9481 
2004 0.8448 0.9548 
Panel B: Mean by region  
Africa & Middle East 0.8706 0.9406 
Asia Pacific 0.8421 0.9410 
Australia 0.8894 0.9495 
Eastern Europe 0.8068 0.9417 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.7855 0.9411 
North America 0.9329 0.9378 
Western Europe 0.8910 0.9373 
Overall mean (N = 3,086) 0.8499 0.9402 
Note: The means by year and region are calculated from the total sample, and do 
not correspond to cross-section or region specific estimates.  
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Table 4: Supervision, regulations and cost efficiency (controlling for bank specific 
and environmental factors) – Tobit regression results 
CAPRQ 0.0066*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0087*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0017 
(0.1829) 
0.0030** 
(0.0249) 
-0.0007 
(0.5208) 
0.0033*** 
(0.0073) 
PRMONIT -0.0207*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0200*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0147*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0175*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0255*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0239*** 
(0.0000) 
OFPR -0.0072*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0074*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0049*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0017 
(0.1012) 
-0.0039*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0071*** 
(0.0000) 
ACTRS -0.0301*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0279*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0336*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0319*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0184*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0323*** 
(0.0000) 
DEPINS 0.0072* 
(0.0983) 
0.0071* 
(0.0925) 
-0.0092** 
(0.0297) 
-0.0024 
(0.5934) 
-0.0044 
(0.2198) 
0.0226*** 
(0.0000) 
SIZE 0.0089*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0023 
(0.2893) 
-0.0109*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0077*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0036* 
(0.0789) 
0.0010 
(0.6856) 
EQAS -0.2977*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2697*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2365*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3335*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3508*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3330*** 
(0.0000) 
GDPGR --- -0.0009 
(0.1606) 
--- --- --- --- 
INF --- -0.0030*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- --- --- 
MACGDP --- --- 0.0094*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- --- 
ASSGDP --- --- -0.0073** 
(0.0360) 
--- --- --- 
CLAIMS --- --- 0.0804*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- --- 
GOVERN --- --- --- 0.0006*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- 
FOREIGN --- --- --- -0.0006*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- 
CONC --- --- --- 0.1261*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- 
PRIGHT --- --- --- --- 0.0377*** 
(0.0000) 
--- 
GOVINT --- --- --- --- 0.0286*** 
(0.0000) 
--- 
ATMKM --- --- --- --- --- -2.05E-06 
(0.9113) 
BRAKM --- --- --- --- --- 0.0003*** 
(0.0000) 
Constant 1.0992*** 
(0.0000) 
1.1131*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0807*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0060*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9580*** 
(0.0000) 
1.1505*** 
(0.0000) 
No. of obs. 2,974 2,974 2,676 2,859 2,948 2,366 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **Statistically significant at the 5% level, *Statistically significant at 
the 10% level; p-values in parentheses; Independent variables are defined in Appendix A; QML (Huber/White) 
standard errors and covariates have been calculated to control for heteroscedacity. 
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Table 5: Supervision, regulations and profit efficiency (controlling for bank specific 
and environmental factors) – Tobit regression results  
 
   
CAPRQ 4.05E-05 
(0.8418) 
2.28E-05 
(0.9100) 
0.0002 
(0.4786) 
0.0004* 
(0.0842) 
0.0004* 
(0.0790) 
7.41E-05 
(0.7430) 
PRMONIT 0.0001 
(0.7243) 
0.0002 
(0.5202) 
0.0006 
(0.2280) 
-0.0001 
(0.7620) 
0.0011*** 
(0.0086) 
0.0002 
(0.7799) 
OFPR -8.08E-06 
(0.9612) 
-0.0001 
(0.5389) 
-9.88E-05 
(0.5690) 
0.0002 
(0.2711) 
-0.0002 
(0.3162) 
-0.0001 
(0.5123) 
ACTRS -0.0022*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0020*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0013** 
(0.0367) 
-0.0029*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0023*** 
(0.0010) 
DEPINS 0.0001 
(0.8295) 
0.0003 
(0.6966) 
0.0002 
(0.7584) 
-9.04E-05 
(0.8951) 
0.0017** 
(0.0132) 
0.0003 
(0.7548) 
SIZE -7.79E-05 
(0.8365) 
-0.0001 
(0.7253) 
-0.0005 
(0.2849) 
-0.0001 
(0.7906) 
0.0011*** 
(0.0057) 
-0.0004 
(0.3425) 
EQAS -0.0150** 
(0.0191) 
-0.0141** 
(0.0256) 
-0.0144** 
(0.0421) 
-0.0165*** 
(0.0093) 
-0.0117* 
(0.0682) 
-0.0140* 
(0.0667) 
GDPGR --- 0.0005*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- --- --- 
INF --- -0.0001*** 
(0.0001) 
--- --- --- --- 
MACGDP --- --- 0.0015*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- --- 
ASSGDP --- --- 0.0002 
(0.7344) 
--- --- --- 
CLAIMS --- --- -0.0006 
(0.4783) 
--- --- --- 
GOVERN --- --- --- -4.02E-05** 
(0.0157) 
--- --- 
FOREIGN --- --- --- 1.75E-05 
(0.1178) 
--- --- 
CONC --- --- --- -0.0009 
(0.6360) 
--- --- 
PRIGHT --- --- --- --- -0.0029*** 
(0.0000) 
--- 
GOVINT --- --- --- --- 3.04E-05 
(0.9236) 
--- 
ATMKM --- --- --- --- --- 3.79E-06 
(0.2041) 
BRAKM --- --- --- --- --- -7.02E-06 
(0.4694) 
Constant 0.9480*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9464*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9445*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9449*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9474*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9492*** 
(0.0000) 
No. of obs. 2,974 2,974 2,676 2,859 2,948 2,366 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **Statistically significant at the 5% level, *Statistically significant at the 10% 
level; p-values in parentheses; Independent variables are defined in Appendix A; QML (Huber/White) standard errors and 
covariates have been calculated to control for heteroscedacity. 
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Appendix A- Information on independent variables 
Variable Category Description Source/Database
Regulatory variables    
CAPRQ Capital  
requirements 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1-7 and 0 otherwise, while the opposite occurs in the 
case of questions 8 and 9 (i.e. yes=0, no =1). (1) Is the minimum required capital asset ratio risk-weighted in line with Basle 
guidelines? (2) Does the ratio vary with individual bank’s credit risk? (3) Does the ratio vary with market risk? (4-6) Before 
minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of the following are deducted from the book value of capital:  (a) market 
value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? (b) unrealized losses in securities portfolios? (c) unrealized foreign 
exchange losses? (7) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? (8) Can 
the initial or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities? (9) Can initial 
disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds?  
WB (Barth et al., 
2004a) 
PRMONIT Private 
monitoring 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of the following ten questions: (1) 
Does accrued, though unpaid interest/principal enter the income statement while loan is non-performing? (2) Are financial 
institutions required to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and any non-bank financial subsidiaries? (3) Are off-
balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? (4) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to public? (5) Must banks disclose their 
risk management procedures to public? (6) Are directors legally liable for erroneous/misleading information? (7) Is an external 
audit compulsory? (8) Are there specific requirements for the extent of audit? (9) Are auditors licensed or certified? (10) Do 
regulations require credit ratings for commercial banks?  
WB (Barth et al., 
2004a) 
OFPR Official 
disciplinary 
power 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of the following ten questions: (1) 
Can the supervisory authorities force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? (2) Are there any mechanisms of 
cease-desist type orders whose infraction leads to automatic imposition of civil & penal sanctions on banks directors & 
managers? (3) Can the supervisory agency order directors/management to constitute provisions to cover actual/potential 
losses? (4) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to distribute dividends? (5) Can the supervisory agency 
suspend director’s decision to distribute bonuses? (6) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to distribute 
management fees? (7) Can the supervisory agency supersede bank shareholder rights and declare bank insolvent? (8) Does 
banking law allow supervisory agency to suspend some or all ownership rights of a problem bank? (9) Regarding bank 
restructuring & reorganization, can supervisory agency remove and replace management? (10) Regarding bank restructuring 
& reorganization, can supervisory agency remove and replace directors? 
 
ACTRS Restrictions on 
banks activities 
The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in: (1) 
securities activities (2) insurance activities (3) real estate activities (4) bank ownership of non-financial firms. These activities 
can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohibited that are assigned the values of 1, 2, 3 or 4 respectively. We use an 
overall index by calculating the average value over the four categories.  
WB (Barth et al., 
2004a) 
DEPINS Deposit insurance 
scheme 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is an explicit deposit insurance scheme and zero otherwise. 
 
  
WB (Barth et al., 
2004a) 
 36 
Control variables    
SIZE                               Bank size   Logarithm of total assets  
EQAS                             Bank capitalization   Equity / total assets  
GDPGR Overall economic 
conditions 
Real GDP growth  GMID 
INF Inflation Annual rate of Inflation GMID  
ASSGDP Size of the 
banking system 
Assets of deposit money banks/ GDP GMID 
CLAIMS Activity in the 
banking sector 
Bank claims to the private sector / GDP GMID 
MACGDP Size of the stock 
market 
Stock market capitalization / GDP GMID 
FOREIGN Presence of 
foreign banks 
Fraction of the banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more foreign-owned WB (Barth et al., 
2004a) 
GOVERN Presence of 
government-
owned banks 
Fraction of the banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more foreign-owned WB (Barth et al., 
2004a) 
CONC Concentration Percentage of assets held by the three largest commercial banks in the country WB (Beck et al., 
2006b) 
PRIGHT Property rights This is an index of property rights that indicates the degree to which a country’s laws protect property rights and the degree to 
which its government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and 
analyzes the independence of the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and business to enforce contracts. The index takes 
values between 1 and 5, with higher values indicating higher property rights protection. (See note below).  
Heritage 
Foundation 
GOVINT Government 
intervention in 
the economy 
This is an index of government intervention in the economy. It measures government’s direct use of scarce resources for its 
own purposes and government’s control over resources through ownership. The index takes values between 1 and 5, with 
higher values indicating higher levels of government consumption in the economy and higher share of revenues received from 
state-owned enterprises and property.   
Heritage 
Foundation 
BRAKM Extent of branch network     Number of branches per 1,000 sq k WB (Beck et al., 
2005). 
ATMKM Extent of ATMs             Number of ATMs per 1,000 sq km WB (Beck et al., 
2005). 
Notes: WB: World Bank; GMID:  Global Market Information Database of Euromonitor International; In its original form, as published by the Heritage Foundation, higher values for the property rights index indicate 
lower protection of private property. Hence, a score of 5 would imply very low protection whereas a score of 1 would indicate very high protection. For the purposes of the present study, for easiness of interpretation, 
we have reversed this scale. Thus, we replaced original values of 5 with 1 and visa versa, as well as original values of 4 with 2 and visa versa. Consequently, in our case higher values indicate more protection. 
 
